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t is often said that the First World War
marks a watershed in modern history.
From the mobilization of armies of un-
fathomable size—more than 60 million men put
on uniforms between 1914 and 1918—to the no
less mind-boggling human cost of the conflict,
both at the front and beyond it (estimated mili-
tary and civilian deaths were nearly equal, at
some 8 million each), the war of 1914 broke all
historical precedent in the scale of its devasta-
tion. Ruling houses that had endured for cen-
turies—the Romanov, Habsburg, and
Ottoman—shook, tottered, and fell, unleashing
yet more misery as these precariously assembled
multiethnic empires were wracked by in-
ternecine warfare. As the war of 1914 spread be-
yond Europe into the Balkans and Middle East,
racial and religious score-settling and reprisals
led inevitably to large-scale ethnic cleansing,
with millions of civilians uprooted from their
ancestral homes, which most would never see
again. Even the victorious Western powers,
France and Britain, suffered a collapse in cul-
tural confidence that arguably has never been re-
paired. After centuries of progress had brought
the West to a position of unparalleled domina-
tion of global affairs, it took only four years for
the whole glittering edifice of European civilization to
fall apart.
If 1914-18 marked an epitaph for Old Europe,
we may usefully ask: Was it murder or suicide? Popu-
lar historians have usually leaned toward the latter ver-
dict, viewing the catastrophe of 1914 as a tragedy of
miscalculation, the idea being that no European
statesmen were truly guilty of intending the war, at least
not the horrendous global war of attrition that it
turned into.1 Since the Fritz Fischer debate of the
1960s professional historians have generally favored
the former explanation, explaining the war’s outbreak
in terms of German and/or Austrian premeditation,
coming down with a verdict of, if not outright homi-
cide, then at least civilizational manslaughter. The
German decision for war in 1914, Holger Herwig
writes in a recent scholarly collection on the conflict,
was not quite Fischer’s aggressive and deliberate “bid
for world power” but rather “a nervous, indeed pan-
icked ‘leap into the dark’ to secure the Reich’s posi-
tion of semihegemony on the Continent.”2 In the new
“consensus” interpretation, Berlin still bears primary
responsibility, no longer for premeditated imperial ag-
gression in the sense implied by the Versailles Treaty
and by Fischer, but for an impulsive preemptive strike
to ward off incipient strategic decline, with further
mitigation in that the Germans received a strong as-
sist in unleashing the dogs of war from their equally
panic-stricken (and equally pessimistic) Austrian al-
lies.3
This sort of moderate academic consensus is
usually welcomed. Now that so few historians have a
real personal or patriotic stake in the controversy (as
many Germans with memories of both world wars
still did in the 1960s), scholars working in the field
today are spared the bitter acrimony of the Fritz Fis-
cher years. Even on the level of practical politics, with
the centennial approaching, there is now a sense of
“goodbye to all that”—literally, as the last German
reparations payment was finally processed in 2010!4
Much as there is to recommend the current con-
sensus on the war of 1914, however, there is also
much not to like. The first problem with any consen-
sus is that it is static, and unlikely to inspire new schol-
arship. Say what one might about the nastiness of the
Fischer debate: precisely because of its sharp edge it
stimulated years of fresh research and passionate ar-
gument. A young historian today, by contrast, is not
likely to be encouraged to tackle perhaps the biggest
question of modern history (responsibility for the
First World War and its consequences) after reading
the kind of works published in recent years, which
tend to declare the matter closed to further discus-
sion.
The second problem grows directly out of the
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first. Scholarly consensus, because it implicitly de-
nies the possibility of argument, tends toward a cer-
tain smugness. As David Fromkin answers his own
question in Europe’s Last Summer: Who Started the
Great War in 1914? (Knopf, 2004), “Briefly and
roughly stated, the answer is that the government
of Austria-Hungary started its local war with Ser-
bia, while Germany’s military leaders started the
worldwide war against France and Russia that be-
came known as the First World War or the Great
War.” Alright, then. What else is there to say?
To be sure, there is wig-
gle room inside the current
consensus. Some historians
focus their fire on the Aus-
trian statesmen who deliber-
ately hounded Serbia into
war, others more on the pol-
icy makers in Berlin who
urged them on.5 Others, like
Niall Ferguson, accept pri-
mary Austro-German re-
sponsibility but still have
harsh words for Britain,
which, alone among the five
main powers, was aloof enough from the two main
alliances to have easily stayed out. With her decision
to enter the war, a European war became a global
one.6 And some German authors continue quietly
to question the Germanocentric explanation about
the outbreak of the war of 1914, even if their works
are usually dismissed or simply ignored by the dom-
inant English-language historians.7
This, though, is about it. It’s been almost forty
years since a major non-German historian was
brave enough to tackle the Germanocentric con-
sensus about the outbreak of war in 1914. The his-
torian was L.C.F. Turner, who looked seriously into
Russia’s role in the July crisis. Yet he focused mostly
on the timing of Russia’s early mobilization, while
paying little attention to Russia’s foreign policy ob-
jectives in going to war—a subject that remains
largely opaque to most First World War generalists.8
Although this was not his intention, Turner’s work
indirectly buttressed the popular-historical explana-
tion of 1914 as a “tragedy of miscalculation,” as he
showed how statesmen such as Sazonov and Beth-
mann Hollweg unwittingly boxed themselves in by
authorizing “limited” military measures (Russia’s
“partial” mobilization against Austria in Sazonov’s
case, Austria’s declaration of war on Serbia in that of
Bethmann Hollweg) while failing to perceive that
these “limited” measures made general war in-
evitable.9
If we take the modified Turner “tragedy of
miscalculation” thesis as the popular pole in current
thinking about 1914, and the modified Fischer
(Herwig/Fromkin) “German-Austrian preemptive
strike” as its scholarly opposite, there is a bit more
room to maneuver than simply inside the latter con-
sensus among professional historians. Even so, the
two poles are not that far apart. Both interpretations
still give the benefit of the doubt to statesmen like
Bethmann Hollweg and Sazonov, if not also to the
trigger-happy generals who advised them. On the
German side, Bethmann Hollweg and especially
Moltke have been harshly judged, to be sure—
Fromkin even fingers the chief of the German gen-
eral staff as the “modest, unexceptional, and indeed
rather ordinary career army officer [who] started the
Great War.”10 And yet there is mitigation even in this
judgment: Fromkin cites as evidence of guilt
Moltke’s later “confession” to having started the
war, which suggests a man wracked by moral doubts
more than an unrepentant war criminal. This is
characteristic of what we might call the post-Fis-
cher view of 1914, in which
the German “crime” was not
one of conscious aggressive
intention, but more a tragic
decision born of a mixture of
fear and foreboding.
Nuanced as it is, there
still seems something odd
about this sort of bloodless
explanation of the outbreak
of the bloodiest war in his-
tory (until its sequel arrived in
1939). Could the war really
have been about nothing
more than a German officer and his complexes? Or,
adopting the only slightly less bloodless popular ex-
planation, did more than 15 million people die, with
countless more millions wounded and/or deprived
of their senses by shell shock (not to mention those
later killed in conflicts born of the breakup of em-
pires in the First World War) all because of a series
of accidental miscalculations by basically well-in-
tentioned statesmen?
It is not impossible, of course, that terrible
events can have senseless causes—one thinks of
natural disasters like earthquakes and hurricanes.
But this is hardly true of the First World War, which
was a manmade calamity if there ever was one. Some-
one must have done something with malice afore-
thought to produce such colossal carnage.
Presumably, considering the human scale and geo-
graphical breadth of the carnage, there must have
been at least several rival someones, with different,
presumably clashing plans, to conjure up such
global destructiveness.
Which men, in short, made the various calami-
ties of the First World War, and for what reasons?
If we pose the question in this way, it becomes ob-
vious that Moltke (or Bethmann Hollweg) cannot
alone shoulder the burden of blame. Whether or
not Fischer was right that the German statesmen of
1914 were collectively lusting for “world power,”
that is, for an enlarged global empire that would rival
Great Britain’s, there were surely some men in Berlin
who thought in these terms—who were paid, in
fact, to do so. Some of these men, in turn, must have
dreamed up and written down plans envisioning
how this might come about, plans that would pre-
sumably involve weakening the British Empire so
as to enable the Germans to supplant it.
The Germans were not alone in this prewar
(and then wartime) geopolitical scheming, of
course. Russian plans for the seizure of Austrian
Galicia, along with Constantinople and the Straits,
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Could the war really
have been about
nothing more than
a German officer
and his complexes?
were far advanced by 1914 and no great secret among
diplomatic professionals. France’s claim on Alsace-
Lorraine was openly avowed, with her plans to con-
quer this lost province assumed matter-of-factly by
German military planners. Britain’s plans to absorb
Germany’s African colonies did not come out of
nowhere, nor did her wartime initiatives in Arabia,
Palestine, and Mesopotamia (even if these, like
French encroachment in Syria and Palestine, were
made possible only after Ottoman
entry into the war, which both Lon-
don and Paris initially sought to pre-
vent).
If the Germans were not alone
in cooking up plans of imperial con-
quest, however, they were uniquely
prolific and even creative in doing so.
Some of these plans, as Fischer
showed us, were in place long before
the war, especially those dealing with
the Ottoman Empire. These preex-
isting plots to disrupt and dismantle
the British, Russian, and French em-
pires may not have caused the war in
quite the way Fischer suggested; but
they did help determine the uncom-
promising character of the war, along
with much of its geographical and
even political course. As the Kaiser
himself wrote on July 30, 1914,
“[England] must . . . have the mask
of Christian peaceableness torn
publicly off her face . . . . Our con-
suls in Turkey and India, agents, etc.,
must inflame the whole Mo-
hammedan world to wild revolt against this hateful,
lying, conscienceless nation of shopkeepers. If we
are to be bled to death, at least England shall lose
India.”11 Written at a time when Germany had not
even begun mobilizing, and nearly a week before
Britain entered the war, these words suggest that a
good deal more than premonitory strategic fear was
at work in driving the German decision for war.
Of course, Wilhelm II was notoriously moody
and unstable, not least when he was composing these
kinds of “marginalia” on diplomatic reports (in this
case, on a dispatch from Friedrich Pourtalès, Ger-
many’s ambassador in St. Petersburg, reporting that
general Russian mobilization was underway). And yet,
however melodramatic in tone, the Kaiser’s words
were not idle: they represented real German policy.
As early as August 2, 1914, after the war between Ger-
many and Russia had begun but before France and
Britain had gone in, Berlin signed an alliance treaty
with the Ottoman Empire with the intention of un-
leashing Islamic holy war against the Entente Pow-
ers. As Moltke instructed the German foreign office
just three days later (after Britain had finally entered
the war), “revolution in India and Egypt, and also in
the Caucasus, is of the highest importance. The treaty
with Turkey will make it possible for the foreign of-
fice to realize the idea and awaken the fanaticism of
Islam.”12
To promote this Turco-German “jihad,” and
much else besides, the German foreign office estab-
lished a kind of all-purpose sabotage bureau for
“Seditious Undertakings Against Our Enemies” (Un-
ternehmungen und Aufwiegelungen gegen unsere Feinde),
under the authority of Arthur Zimmermann, the
under-secretary of state. The operational mastermind
of the holy war stratagem was Baron Max von Op-
penheim, a confidant of the Kaiser’s who had been
scheming for years to unleash global jihad against the
British Empire.13 Alongside Oppenheim’s jihad oper-
ation, which primarily targeted Britain, Zimmer-
mann’s sabotage bureau also launched a “Zionist”
initiative aimed at toppling the Tsarist regime in Rus-
sia. These two ideas were curiously blended together
in a remarkable policy paper prepared by a func-
tionary in Zimmermann’s sabotage bureau (probably
Otto von Wesendonck) on August 16, 1914—the
fighting in Europe had still scarcely begun—on the
“Revolutionary Activity We Will Undertake in the Is-
lamic-Israelite World.” Turco-German jihadi propa-
ganda against British perfidy, spread cunningly
among Hajj pilgrims coming to and from Arabia by
way of Cairo, and backed by the distribution of
weapons to Egyptian rebels and the emir of
Afghanistan, would allow “the waves of rebellion to
spread from Egypt to Mecca to the entire Islamic
world as far as India.” Meanwhile, the global Zionist
executive (conveniently headquartered in Berlin)
would prepare leaflets exhorting Jews in the Pale of
Settlement to sabotage grain deliveries, thus literally
starving the Russian army and permitting the Ger-
mans to advance with ease into the East European
plain. Once the regime in Petrograd began to wob-
ble, Russian Jews would then lead the way in toppling
the Russian tsar, greatest enemy of world Jewry.14
There was a kind of mad prescience to German
strategic thinking, such that policies hatched at the
Wilhelmstrasse at the beginning of the war antici-
pated world-historical developments at its end—and
indeed helped determine them, in the logic of the
self-fulfilling prophecy. Of course, not everything
transpired precisely as Wesendonck predicted. The
Germans likely exaggerated the potential for Islamic
sedition in British India and Egypt, which both stayed
relatively quiet during the war. Nor did the German
jihad stratagem fare much better in Central Asia,
which German agents (save one) never succeeded in
penetrating, nor in French North Africa. The Sanussi
order of Islamic warriors did capture a number of
Egyptian towns from the British in
the “coastal campaign” of the win-
ter of 1915-16, causing serious con-
cern in Cairo, but these victories,
however dramatic at the time, were
short-lived. The Zionists, too,
proved a disappointment to Berlin,
to the extent that most Western (al-
though not German) Zionists even
embraced the Entente side after the
Balfour declaration of 1917.15
This is, however, taking per-
haps too literal a reading of We-
sendonck’s memorandum. To
modify Marx, imperial sabotage
stratagems do not always produce
the revolutions they foresee; but if
prepared by serious and imaginative
Germans, they do seem to produce
revolutions. The German jihad
stratagem, when combined with
Berlin’s ill-fated dalliance with Zi-
onism, proved incendiary, not least
because it provoked the British into
taking aggressive countermeasures.
Kitchener’s notoriously ill-con-
ceived offer of a renewed, non-Ottoman Caliphate
to Sherif Hussein of Mecca in the winter of 1914-15
actually rehashed an old idea born in the Cairo resi-
dency during the “Aqaba” crisis of 1906, the initia-
tive on both occasions being provoked by the
Germans’ use of the Ottoman caliphate to stir Mus-
lim opinion against the British. Hussein’s vaunted
“Arab revolt” of 1916, which according to the popu-
lar “Lawrence of Arabia” legend spawned secular
Arab nationalism, was in fact couched locally in
purely Islamic terms, as a protest against the sacrile-
gious acts of the Young Turks, beginning with their il-
legal deposition of Sultan-caliph Abdul Hamid II in
1909: Hussein was laying claim to the caliphate they
had thus besmirched (and which Hussein thought the
British had promised him). In similar fashion, the Bal-
four declaration of November 2, 1917 envisioning
the creation of a “national home for the Jewish peo-
ple” in Palestine was issued in response to an editorial
by a German Zionist in the Vossische Zeitung published
several weeks previously, which frightened Whitehall
into thinking the Germans were about to make their
own move. The British endorsement of Zionism that
led to the creation of the state of Israel, like the
British-supported “Arab revolt” that helped split the
Ottoman Empire in two, was hatched in retaliation
to Germany’s own revolutionary sabotage stratagems.
In the case of the Russian Revolutions of 1917,
the connection to German policy was even more di-
rect. German generals, on the advice of German
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Zionists, drew up propaganda leaflets, which were
dropped behind Russian front lines in 1914: they
asked the “Jews of Russia” to “take up arms” against
the tsar, whether they were “Nationalists, Zionists, or
Socialists.” While it is true that very few Jews inside
Russia followed this rather dangerous advice, and that
the German Zionists themselves later had second
thoughts about opening the “genie” of perceived
Jewish disloyalty and sedition in the fevered atmos-
phere of wartime Russia, German support for Russ-
ian socialists in exile (many, though not all of them,
Jewish) had more serious consequences. Perhaps fit-
tingly, in that Zimmerman’s sabotage bureau saw the
jihad and Judeo-Zion-
ist stratagems as com-
plementary, the key
moment in the Russian
stratagem occurred in-
side the German em-
bassy in
Constantinople, when
in January 1915
Alexander Israel
“Parvus” Helphand
first proposed that
Berlin fund Lenin.
“The interests of the
German government,”
Parvus told Ambassador Hans von Wangenheim,
“are identical with those of the Russian revolutionar-
ies.” (In a stunning and little-known parallel, just on
the other side of Taksim square in the Pera Palace
hotel, three months later Feisal, son of Sherif Hus-
sein of Mecca, told Max von Oppenheim that “the
interests of Islam are entirely identical with those of
Germany.”)16 While it is true that German-financed
revolutionaries played little role in the February Rev-
olution of 1917, Lenin famously traveled from
Switzerland to Russia under German military escort
(at least as far as neutral Sweden), and received Ger-
man funds wired via Stockholm during the crucial
summer months when the Bolsheviks were gathering
their strength. After the October Revolution, Lenin
proved just as perfect a tool of the German govern-
ment as Parvus had promised, sending an immediate
request for a ceasefire en clair (that is, without encryp-
tion) to German military headquarters, dissolving the
tsarist army, and not least browbeating his fellow Bol-
sheviks into signing the draconian Brest-Litovsk
Treaty in March 1918, which turned over to Germany
(and its new satellites) 750,000 square kilometers con-
taining 55 million previously Russian subjects, more
than half of Russia’s factories, and three-quarters of
her coal and iron deposits (a supplementary provi-
sion of Brest-Litovsk, negotiated in August 1918, also
guaranteed the Germans at least 25% of Baku’s im-
mense oil output).17
It is testimony to the prolific, if slightly unhinged,
quality of geopolitical imagination in the German for-
eign office that a revolution of another sort was
cooked up at the same time, by many of the same
people, with consequences just as enduring as the ad-
vent of communism. This was the ill-fated “Zimmer-
mann telegram” dispatched on January 16, 1917,
which promised Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico to
Mexico if she declared war on the United States. In-
tercepted and decoded by the British, who (very, very
carefully) brought it to Washington’s attention, the
Zimmermann telegram, compounded by the Ger-
man resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare,
gave America its casus belli to enter the war in April
1917—and yet even then reluctantly, as an “associ-
ated” (not Allied) power of the Entente coalition.
This last revolution, of course, backfired badly
on its authors. U.S. intervention, by summoning up 4
million American “doughboys” to tip the balance on
the Western Front, cost the Germans the war. It is im-
portant to remember this, for had Zimmermann’s
sabotage bureau not so
stupidly sabotaged the
German position in the
West, the revolutions of
the East would have
turned out considerably
differently. With a Ger-
man occupation army,
1 million strong, back-
ing their regime, the
Bolsheviks were not
truly sovereign until the
German armies col-
lapsed on the Western
Front. Able to draw on
the immense resources of European Russia, as well as
Baku’s oil, the Germans would have been in a virtu-
ally impregnable position from which to negotiate a
compromise peace with Britain, with German pri-
macy in the Balkans, Russia, and Turkish Anatolia
granted in exchange for British control of India,
Egypt, Arabia, and Palestine. Syria and Mesopotamia
might then have been partitioned, with a French
buffer zone separating the two giants along the lines
of the Sykes-Picot agreement (i.e., with the Germans
inheriting the “Russian” zone, now that Russia was a
German puppet state). The French, to be sure, would
have been embittered by such a settlement, but with
the undefeated Germans dominating postwar Eu-
rope, they could have done little about it. Absent its
casus belli, the U.S., too, would have had to accept Ger-
man ascendancy, and might have been quite happy to
trade with the new colossus. This profound revolu-
tion in global affairs could have been Germany’s to
keep, had not the Germans unleashed one revolution-
ary gambit too many. Setting out, in Trotsky’s phrase,
to “overthrow the world” as it existed in 1914, Ger-
many’s peculiarly gifted geopolitical visionaries, with
malice aforethought, had done exactly that, unleash-
ing the deadly fires of war and revolution across half
the globe. But they had also, unwittingly, destroyed
their own empire.
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Had Zimmermann’s sabotage
bureau not so stupidly sabo-
taged the German position in
the West, the revolutions of
the East would have turned
out considerably differently.
